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a b s t r a c t
This paper addresses the always online behavior of the data owner in proxy re-
encryption schemes for re-encryption keys issuing. We extend and adapt multi-authority
ciphertext policy attribute based encryption techniques to type-based proxy
re-encryption to build our solution. As a result, user authentication and user autho-
rization are moved to the cloud server which does not require further interaction with
the data owner, data owner and data users identities are hidden from the cloud server,
and re-encryption keys are only issued to legitimate users. An in depth analysis shows
that our scheme is secure, flexible and efficient for mobile cloud computing
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Mobile cloud computing enables mobile devices to perform heavy resource-demanding tasks thanks to the availability
of cloud-based resources through heterogeneous wireless networks. An exhaustive description of mobile cloud computing
(MCC) architecture can be found in [1]. As more mobile devices are increasingly being used nowadays to store and process
personal and corporate data [2], there are growing concerns regarding the privacy and confidentiality of sensitive data as
the device can be stolen, compromised or hacked. Moreover, applications running on the mobile device should consume
the least possible amount of energy. Therefore, any security solution designed for mobile cloud data storage should be
mobile device resource-friendly.
The main drawback of outsourcing data to the cloud is that sensitive data can be accessed by a breached cloud
service provider (CSP), as well as by some unauthorized users, leading to a confidentiality breach. Encryption has been
proposed as a solution to secure data. However, only a limited number of operations can be performed on encrypted
data, with one operation of interest being the search over encrypted cloud data as described in [3]. Requiring the user to
download all the encrypted data locally before attempting decryption incurs many inconveniences among which, a high
data transmission overload and, due to the cloud computing principle of pay-as-you-go, high financial expenditures. Such
scheme additionally poses a problem of user authentication and authorization as arbitrary ciphertexts from different data
owners can directly be accessed by any user without prior authorization mean. Attribute based encryption (ABE) has been
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introduced in [4] as a promising solution to address the issue of access authorization and proxy re-encryption (PRE) has
been proposed in [5] to allow data owners to control who has access to the data stored on cloud. The proposed scheme
in [5] was not however flexible enough , as users could access the whole data set in an all-or-nothing fashion. The data
owner by grouping its data in categories and requiring access only to a subset of the whole dataset could then promote
a more flexible scheme.
To allow the data owner to better manage access to the different subsets of his dataset, the type-based proxy re-
encryption (TB-PRE) technique was proposed in [6]. The interesting work in [7], which exhibits overall good performances
over other TB-PRE schemes in [6,8,9] and [10], successfully achieves data protection integrity as well as user authentication
using Boney–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) signature and Merkle hash tree. However, data access control is performed using
unhidden user identity and unmasked data type at the proxy level, leading to a non-anonymity of users as the cloud
could learn the association between each user and the type of data requested. Furthermore the scheme in [7] is not
flexible enough as the data owner has to be constantly online during ciphertext access. Such solution obviously incurs
heavy computation and communication overhead on the data owner who needs to be always available even during idle
times and can even become a system performance bottleneck.
There are three major technical challenges in dealing with proxy re-encryption schemes for mobile cloud computing.
First, the scheme should ensure minimal computation and communication overhead on both data user and data owner
sides. Second, the scheme should ensure the legitimate user has access to the right re-encryption key, while maintaining
user anonymity and data privacy. Third, the scheme must provide chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security, meaning that
if the adversary is not amongst the intended receivers made of the data owner and authorized data users, it should not
be able to obtain any useful information about the plaintext even if it proceeds with chosen ciphertext attacks.
In this paper, we implement both privacy preserving cloud-user authentication and re-encryption key access control
approaches by combining the efficient multi-authority ABE scheme in [11] which we modified to suit our purpose,
and the scheme in [7]. We avoid weaker re-encryption schemes wherein the proxy possesses both parties’ keys
simultaneously [12], by following the work in [13] entrusting the data owner to generate re-encryption keys for a stronger
user authorization. In our work, the data owner no longer needs to always be online and user identities privacy as well
as category privacy are guaranteed through blind decryption.
Our contributions in this paper are given below.
• We propose an offline type-based proxy re-encryption with privacy preservation such that not only data owners and
data users’ identities are hidden from the cloud, but also the cloud cannot learn any useful information regarding
the category of data stored or the category of data to be accessed.
• We improve the flexibility of user authorization and authentication procedures by no longer needing the data owner
to be constantly online, by producing ahead of time all the required parameters for the authorized users.
• In depth analysis shows that our scheme is secure, flexible and induces minimal computation and storage overhead.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related works. Section 3 introduces some
preliminaries while Section 4 presents the system model, the security model as well as the design goals in MCC. In
Section 5, we propose an offline privacy-preserving PRE. Section 6 addresses the security of our proxy re-encryption
protocol, while in depth performance analysis is given in Section 7. Section 8 discusses the different findings, limitations
and possible improvements of our scheme. We finally conclude in Section 9.
2. Related works
We review in this section two categories of work: attribute based encryption and proxy re-encryption
2.1. Attribute based encryption
Sahai and Waters introduced in [4] the first attribute-based encryption (ABE) which relies on identity based encryption
(IBE) and on the concept of secret sharing. Their scheme does not however offer enough access control flexibility. For fine
grained access control, two flavors of ABE were proposed: key-policy ABE (KPABE) in [14] which suffers from trust in the
key issuing process to the legitimate user, and ciphertext-policy ABE (CPABE) in [15] solving the key issuing problem.
We focus in this paper on the CPABE scheme although it suffers from performance bottlenecks due to the use of pairings
and to the increase in the number of users, as well as from the key escrow issue depicted in [16], where an authority
alone possesses enough abilities to decrypt users’ messages. Chase proposed in [17] the first multi-authority ABE based
on CPABE and solved the performance problem of previous schemes. However, the scheme still suffers from the key
escrow issue where the central authority (CA) could decrypt every ciphertext. Later on, Chase and Chow proposed in [18]
a solution which removes the trusted CA and prevents attribute authorities from pooling their information on particular
users. The scheme however could not totally solve the key escrow issue. Our previous work in [11] follows the work [19]
by removing the CA and putting trust upon the data owner for secret parameters generation in order to solve the key
escrow problem. In this paper, we improve and adapt our previous work [11] into the type-based proxy re-encryption
environment in order to build our solution.
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2.2. Proxy re-encryption
Blaze et al. in 1998 introduced in [20] the first ElGamal-based transitive and non-collusion resistant bidirectional
PRE scheme. Moreover, bidirectionality property is not very desirable in most real-world configurations. Ateniese et al.
provided in [21] the first unidirectional PRE construction based on bilinear maps which is collusion resistant and
non-transitive. However, their scheme only offers chosen plaintext security which is not sufficient for many practical
applications. In 2007, Canetti and Hohenberger proposed a security definition against chosen ciphertext attacks (CCAs)
for a PRE scheme and constructed an efficient bidirectional CCA secure PRE scheme relying on bilinear pairing. In the
same year Chu and Tseng in [22] as well as Green and Ateniese in [23] proposed CCA secure unidirectional identity-based
PRE schemes. However, such schemes provide an access control in an all-or-nothing fashion as stated in [9], which is not
of interest in a desired fine grained access control environment. In 2008, Tang proposed in [6] a type based PRE (TB-PRE)
scheme enabling a delegator to selectively delegate the decryption right to a delegatee through a chosen proxy. In 2009,
a CCA secure conditional PRE was proposed by Weng et al. in both [24] and [25] to allow the ciphertext satisfying a
condition set specified to be transformed by the proxy. For more flexibility, the scheme in [26] proposed a time-release
proxy conditional re-encryption scheme in which a receiver cannot obtain any information about the file until a specified
time arrives. [27] further introduced a conditional PRE called sender-specified PRE (SS-PRE) which enables the delegation
of decryption right from a specified sender to his/her delegatee. As we focus on TB-PRE schemes, the work in [7] allows
data protection integrity as well as user authentication using Boney–Lynn–Sasham (BLS) signature and Merkle hash tree.
It however exposes users identities and accessed data categories and is not flexible enough as the data owner has to be
constantly online during data request. This paper improves the TB-PRE scheme proposed in [7] and provides a new model
for secure data distribution in proxy re-encryption for mobile cloud computing.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some preliminaries we believe important for understanding the rest of the paper.
3.1. Bilinear map
Let G0, G1, GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G0, h a generator of G1 and e, a
bilinear map such that e : G0 ⇥ G1  ! GT . e has the properties listed as follows:
1. Bilinearity: for all u, v 2 G and a, b 2 Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
2. Non degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1
G0, G1, GT are said to be bilinear groups if the group operation in G0, G1 and GT as well as the bilinear map e : G0⇥G1  ! GT
are both efficiently computable.
3.2. Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) assumption in a bilinear group G0 of prime order p with generator g
is defined as follows: on input g, ga, gb, gc 2 G0 and e(g, g)z 2 GT , where e : G0 ⇥ G0  ! GT is a bilinear map, and a, b,
and c 2 Zp, no probabilistic polynomial time adversary can decide whether e(g, g)z = e(g, g)abc , that is deciding whether
z = abc or z is a random element 6= abc , with a non-negligible advantage. The assumption relies on the fact that the
discrete logarithm is hard to be solved in large number field.
4. Problem statement
We consider in our system four main entities, namely, the data owner (DO), a set of attribute authorities (AA) logically
playing the same role but managing disjoint sets of attributes, the cloud service provider (CSP) also considered as proxy
server, and hosting the cloud user assistant (CUA) described in [11], and finally the data user (DU).
4.1. Core functionalities
In this subsection, we present the three core functionalities of our scheme: re-encryption key pre-generation, cloud
based authentication and cloud based authorization. In our scheme, the data owner and all its users must share a secret
hash function denoted as Hash, as in [28], to provide anonymity of ciphertexts re-encryption as in [29] as well as data
category privacy preservation, so that the cloud operates through blind decryption. We examine the use of such hash
function in the security analysis section of our paper. Re-encryption key pre-generation allows the various re-encryption
keys associated each one with a legitimate user to be produced by the data owner for a specific category, prior to
their secure outsourcing so that legitimate users can claim them directly from the cloud server while the data owner
is offline. Re-encryption keys are uploaded to the cloud server in the form of data structures denoted as authorization
structures depicted in Fig. 1. More details on the re-encryption key generation process are given in Fig. 2. Cloud based
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Fig. 1. Overview of an authorization structure.
Fig. 2. Sequence diagram for generating an authorization structure.
authentication, our second core operation aims to verify whether a user is legitimate in accessing a given category so that
the cloud can attempt to recompute the desired ciphertext belonging to that category. Cloud based authentication relies on
multi-authority ABE operations for which the user will use its key obtained from both the data owner and the requested
attribute authorities to decrypt a challenge ciphertext generated by the data owner and uploaded to the cloud. If the user
is granted access to the given category, the cloud will search through the user authorization structure the corresponding
re-encryption key to re-compute the user desired ciphertext. We provide more details on the cloud based authentication
functionality in Fig. 3. Cloud based authorization, our third core functionality takes place immediately after successful
user cloud based authentication. It relies on the fact that the DO can choose to generate or not re-encryption key for a
given category. After successful cloud based authentication, the cloud will search the user authorization structure for the
re-encryption key in order to recompute the desired ciphertext. An absence of re-encryption key means the user is not
authorized to access the data even though such user has been previously authenticated. This brings an additional level
of flexibility in user access control and we depict the process in more details in Fig. 4 below. All the other operations
in our scheme are multi-authority ABE operations based on our previous work in [11] which complement our three
above-mentioned core functionalities.
4.2. System model
Our system model is depicted in Fig. 5 and we briefly describe in the following lines the different actors in our scheme.
1. The data owner (DO) in this work stores a local list of authorized users for which it performs pre-computations
allowing it to remain offline during further steps of the system operations. We assume in this paper that when a
user is revoked, its record will be removed from the authorized users’ list in the DO local storage.
2. The cloud service provider (CSP) or simply cloud server in this scheme plays the additional role of proxy server as
in [22,23] and [7]. The cloud server performs user authentication and user authorization for every user requesting
data access.
3. The attribute authorities (AA) in our paper issue attributes to the DO for realizing encryption policy. They moreover
generate blinded attribute secret keys for every data user requesting encrypted data access.
4. The data user (DU) in the scheme computes its own authentication key which will be uploaded to the cloud for
authentication’s purpose. DU uploads as well its hashed identity to the cloud to perform user authorization.
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Fig. 3. Sequence diagram of our cloud based authentication process.
Fig. 4. Sequence diagram of our cloud based authorization process.
Fig. 5. System model overview of our proxy re-encryption system.
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4.3. Security model
In our work, the data owner (DO) is considered a fully trusted entity, a claim which goes in line with the work of [13] in
which the authors entrust the encryptor to produce re-encryption keys reKey for the different users in order to control the
re-encryption key issuing to the legitimate user. The cloud server in our paper is considered honest-but-curious, meaning
it will execute all the operations under its responsibility but might want to get more insights into the user authentication
and authorization operations, as well as into the decryption process. The attribute authorities (AA) are as well as the
cloud server, considered honest-but-curious meaning they will follow the desired protocol but may want to collude with
data users to gain additional privileges in the user authentication and authorization processes taking place in the cloud
server. Last but not least, the data user is considered untrusted in our paper as it is willing to collude with other users
in order to get more privilege than granted, and to access data from a particular data owner. We furthermore prove our
scheme to be indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) under the DBDH assumption in the random
oracle model. We rely on the security model definitions of a TB-PRE scheme in [6] and [8].
5. Cloud-based multi-authority ABE access control and offline proxy re-encryption
Our offline multi-authority ABE privacy-preserving PRE for mobile cloud computing consists of two fundamental
operations realizing our three core functionalities, namely data owner key generation producing re-encryption keys,
and cloud based authentication coupled with cloud based authorization. These two operations are complemented by six
operations based on our previous work in [11] which are qualified as privilege operations, with the different parameters
produced at each stage of the six operations, at the exception of the setup operation, bearing the name of privilege
parameters. Let k be the initial security parameter and l = 2k. Let G1, G2 and GT be bilinear groups of prime order p,
and let g be a generator of G1 and gp be a generator of G2. Let e : G1 ⇥ G2  ! GT denote the bilinear map, we therefore
assume e(g, gp) is the generator of GT . Additionally, let H0 : {0, 1}⇤  ! Z⇤p , H1 : {0, 1}l  ! Zp, H2 : GT  ! {0, 1}l and H3 :
G1 ⇥ {0, 1}⇤  ! G1 be families of hash functions. The eight different operations in our scheme are as follow:
• Setup(1k): The setup operation produces the system public parameters and master secret key. It takes an implicit
input security parameter depicted as 1k and further chooses four random exponents ↵,   2 Zp, g 2 G1, gp 2 G2,
and computes e(g, gp)↵ , e(g, gp), g↵ and g1/  . Finally, the setup operation uniformly chooses h0  H0, h1    H1,
h2    H2 and h3    H3 at random. The message space is set to P = {0, 1}k and the type space is set to T = {0, 1}⇤.
It publishes the public parameters as PP = {g, gp, h = g  , f = g1/  , Y = e(g, gp)↵, Z = e(g, gp), h0, h1, h2, h3, P, T }
and the master secret key as MSK = { , g↵p }.
• KeygenDO(PP,MSK , userID, categoryList): The data owner privilege key generation algorithm produces three kinds
of user keys sent via secure channel to the data user i: DO privilege key privKey, public and private keys respectively
pki and ski. privKey and pki are considered public while ski should remain secret. The algorithm takes as input
PP , MSK , and the plain user identity userID, further hashed using the secret hash function Hash. The parameter
categoryList denotes the list of categories to which a particular user has access authorization, and is used to produce
the re-encryption keys rki !j,Hash(dataType) for the user userID. The variable dataType can be obtained by iterating
on categoryList . To produce the user i private key ski and the user i’s public key pki, the DO uniformly chooses
two random exponents ↵i,  i 2 Zp, and publishes pki = {g↵i , g ip } and ski = {↵i, i}. Furthermore to compute
the DO privilege key, the DO chooses two random r ,   2 Zp and publishes part of the user privilege key as
DO_key = (g (↵+r)/  , g  , pki, ski). DO generates as well   = g (r+  ) that it sends to all requested AA via secure channel
for attribute secret keys generation. The algorithm further computes the re-encryption key given the ith DO and the
jth data user such that reKeyski !pkj,Hash(dataType) = pk
1
H0(Hash(dataType)+ski,1)
j,2 , where pkj,2 = g jp , and ski,1 = ↵i. The different
re-encryption keys rki !j,Hash(dataType) corresponding to the different users for a given category Hash(dataType), will
be aggregated into an authorization structure authStruct and uploaded to the cloud for user authorization purpose.
• Encrypt(PP,m, T , pki, dataType): The data encryption stage is subdivided into two operations: the generation of the
privilege ciphertext and the encryption of the plain data using the type-based proxy re-encryption (TB-PRE) approach
as globally described in [7]. The encrypt operation takes as input the DO public key pki, a messageM such thatM 2 P .
It further takes a category dataType, computes t 0 = Hash(dataType), chooses a uniform and random p   {0, 1}k and
computes: v    H1(M k p), c0 = (gH0(t 0)pki,1)v , c1 = H2(Y r )   (M k p) and c2 = H3(c0, c1)v . Finally, the encrypt
operation returns the ciphertext Ci = (Hash(dataType), c0, c1, c2).
• KeygenAA(PP, , S): The attribute authority privilege key generation depicted in [11] produces the attribute author-
ity privilege key AA_key given a set of attributes S which is further sent to the user via secure channel.
• KeygenAggregate(PP , ✓ , (8j 2 N, AAj_key)): The attribute authority privilege key aggregation described in our
previous work in [11] relies on the cloud user assistant (CUA) to alleviate computation and communication overhead
on the data user by combining the result of the keygenAA operation performed by each solicited AA.
• PrivKeygenUser(PP,DO_key, CUA_key): Detailed in our previous work in [11], the privilege data user key generation
algorithm performed by the data user aims to produce the user privilege key privKey.
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Fig. 6. Information flow among the entities in our proxy re-encryption system.
• CloudCheck(PP, privKey,Hash(userID), privCipher , Ci, authStruct, pkj): This algorithm is operated by the cloud service
provider in two important operations: data user authentication followed by data user authorization. The data user
authentication relies on the multi-authority decryption operation in [11] and takes as input privKey and privCipher .
if the decryption outputs Hash(dataType), the user has access the category dataType. The decryption fails by giving as
output ?. The data user authorization process takes as inputs Hash(userID) and authStruct . If the cloud cannot find
authStruct corresponding to Hash(userID) the data authorization outputs ?. If successful, the cloud will search the
correspondence of Hash(userID) in authStruct and will output the corresponding reKey or ? if nothing is found. Given
a re-encryption key reKey = rkski !pkj,Hash(dataType) and the ciphertext Ci = (Hash(dataType), c0, c1, c2), the algorithm
checks whether e(c0,H3(c0, c1,Hash(dataType))) = e(gH0(Hash(dataType))pki,1, c2) holds. If it does not hold, the algorithm
returns ? and reports failure, else the algorithm computes c 00 = e(c0, rkski !pkj,Hash(dataType)) = e(g, pkj,2)v and returns
the re-encrypted ciphertext Cj = (c 00, c1).
• Decrypt(skj, Ci). The decrypt algorithm performed by the data user takes as input the user private key skj expressed
as ski = {↵i, i} and the ciphertext Ci while distinguishing two cases. In the first case the ciphertext is an
original ciphertext and the algorithm parses Ci = (Hash(dataType), c0, c1, c2). It further checks if e(c0,H3(c0, c1,
Hash(dataType))) = e(gH0(Hash(dataType))pki,1, c2) holds, and return ? if not. If the equation holds, the algorithm
computes K = e(c0, h
1
H0(Hash(dataType))+ski,1 ) and M k p = c1   H2(K ). Finally, the algorithm returns M if c2 =
H3(c0, c1)H1(Mkp) else it returns ?.
In the second case, the ciphertext Ci is a re-encrypted ciphertext and the algorithm parses Ci = (c0, c1). It further
computes K = c
1
ski,2
0 and M k p = c1 H2(K ). The algorithm finally returns M if c0 = e(g, pkj,2)H1(Mkp), else it returns?.
We give high level details on the flow of information among entities within our scheme, in Fig. 6.
6. Security analysis
We address in this section the security analysis of our offline scheme.
6.1. Key-escrow issue
We follow the work in [13] and entrust the DO to produce system wide public and master keys, data user public and
private keys as well as parts of the user privilege key. As the generation of the privilege key requires both the DO and
attribute authorities (AA), no single entity in our scheme possesses enough privileges to generate all the parameters on
itself. Our scheme is thus key-escrow free.
6.2. Secret hash function
We are aware that our scheme seems to violate the Kerckhoffs principle as described in [30] stating that a cryptosystem
should only have its key as secret. We however argue on the importance of such function in our scheme. The used secret
hash function in our work allows the cloud to operate without learning any sensitive information. Sharing a secret hash
function is like sharing a secret key because data owners and authorized users can both construct a keyed hash function
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Table 1
Useful variables and associated description.
Variable Description
NAA Number of requested attribute authorities
Nu Number of users under management of each DO
Nt Number of categories
Nc Number of conditions
Table 2
Storage overhead in bytes.
[7] [26] [27] Our scheme
Data owner 385 + 100 ⇥Nt 152 + 100 ⇥Nc 152 1699 + 4 ⇥Nu
Data user 385 152 152 322
such as HMAC depicted in [31], with the hash algorithm being public knowledge and the key being the only secret in
accordance with the Kerckhoffs principle. Furthermore, it is a common security measure to seal security computations in
hardware entities generally referred as tokens. This is in fact a better security practice than to directly handle the secret
keys and secret hash function to users and to ask them to configure their computing devices.
6.3. Data user revocation
In our scheme, we adopt the lazy access revocation method such that the DO can specify an attribute timestamp during
the generation of the privilege ciphertext. Access to the specific category of data will be allowed within a time frame
specified by the attribute timestamp. Data users are able to access the category before the expiration of the timestamp,
and the DO can grant access to the non-revoked users by issuing a new privilege ciphertext for the category without
recomputing the re-encryption keys or the TB-PRE ciphertext.
6.4. IND-CCA security under DBDH assumption in the random oracle model
Security in TB-PRE schemes requires the master key security property, meaning that a proxy with re-encryption keys
and malicious data users without permissions or with access permission to data type t , must not be able to collude
in order to access data for which they do not have access. We prove that our construction is secure against chosen
ciphertext attacks (CCA) under the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption (DBDH) in the random oracle model
(See Appendix).
7. Performance analysis
We address in this section the various experiments to show the efficiency, efficacy and flexibility of our scheme.
We compare our scheme with the works in [7,26] and [27]. As the original work in [7], we let the security parameter
k = 128 by using the Barreto–Naehrig (BN) curve defined in [32] over Fp256. The group elements in G0, G1, GT and
Zp can be represented respectively in 128 bytes, 33 bytes, 384 bytes and 32 bytes. We further assume that each user
identity is expressed over 4 bytes and that the length of the category names is at most 64 bytes. We use SHA-256 as our
secret cryptographic hash function and our code moreover derives from the CP-ABE toolkit in [33] and the pairing-based
cryptography (PBC), in [34], version 0.5.12 with type F curve. We give in Table 1, some notations to be used throughout
this section.
7.1. Storage
As in [7], the DO stores a users’ list where each entry has 4 bytes, the public parameters weight 1409 bytes, and the
master secret key 65 bytes. The user public key weights 161 bytes and the user private key 64 bytes. Each data user
privilege key in our scheme has 322 bytes. We assume in [26] that the DO stores a list L of different conditions and each
condition entry in L needs 100 bytes. We further give in Table 2, comparison results.
7.2. Computation
We analyze here the computations performed on both the data owner and the data user sides.
1. Multiplication, Exponentiation and Pairing Cost
Let Cm denote the cost of a multiplication in G1 and G2, Ce the cost of an exponentiation in G1 and G2 and Cp the
cost of a pairing in GT . We give the computation comparison between our scheme and the works in [7,26] and [27],
in Table 3.
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Table 3
Computation cost.
textbf [7] [26] [27] Our scheme
Setup 2(Cm
+Ce + Cp) 3Cm
+Ce + Cp 2Cp Cm+
5(Ce + Cp)
Key issuing 2Ce Ce Ce Cm + 8Ce
Encryption 2Cm + 3Ce 2Cm+
4Ce + 2Cp 4Cm
+6Ce + Cp 2Cm+
5Ce + Cp
Decryption Cm+
3Ce + 4Cp 3Cm+
2Ce + 4Cp Cm + 4Cp 2Ce + 4Cp
Table 4
Encryption and decryption speed.
[7] [26] [27] Our scheme
Encryption tp + 2te tp + 5te tp + 4te tp + tme + 5te
Decryption 5tp + 2tme + 2te 3tp + 2te 6tp 2tp + 2tme + 2te
2. Encryption and Decryption time
We denote tp, te, and tme, as being respectively the time for computing a bilinear pairing, the time for operating an
exponentiation and the time for computing a multi-exponentiation in the bilinear group. Table 4 gives a comparison
between our scheme and the works in [7,26] and [27] in terms of speed of encryption and decryption.
8. Discussion
Our scheme successfully achieves a privacy preserving proxy re-encryption protocol keeping the data owner offline
after the key generation stage. Although our scheme exhibits more computation and more storage overhead on the DO,
its benefits however are numerous. Our scheme allows the early generation of all the necessary parameters so that the
DO does not intervene in subsequent data access control, rendering our scheme more flexible than the schemes in [7,26]
and [27]. Our scheme is further more mobile-friendly, as it provides overall less computation cost and storage overhead
on the data user side, as well as more security over the works in [7,26] and [27] relying on trusted third party entities
and exposing sensitive data.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we address the issue of having the data owner being constantly online in order to issue re-encryption
keys to authorized users in a type based proxy re-encryption configuration, and in a mobile cloud environment. Our
scheme relies on the cloud server to authenticate every data user and check that it is authorized to access a specific data
from a given category. To furthermore keep user anonymity and data privacy, we use a secret hash function to be shared
only between a data owner and its users with the cloud having no knowledge of it. We finally show that our scheme,
while increasing the payload on data owner’s side for flexibility, greatly reduces the computation and storage overhead
on the data user side, and can be considered as a mobile device-friendly protocol.
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Appendix. Security model and security proof of our offline proxy re-encryption scheme
A.1. Security model
We first mention in this section the security model of a type-based proxy re-encryption scheme (TB-PRE) depicted
in [25] and [35]. We consider the following oracles which model the ability of an adversary as well as which are provided
to the adversary A by a challenger C simulating an environment running TB-PRE:
• Uncorrupted key generation oracle Oukg (i, t, pki, pkj): Given user identity i and category t 2 T , The challenger C
chooses a security parameter k and runs the algorithm KeygenDO(i, t, pki, pkj) to generate a key pair (pki, ski). C
returns pki to A and inputs (pki, ski) in Table Tk. Furthermore, given two public keys pki, pkj such that (pki, pkj) 2 Tk,
and a type t , C runs the KeygenDO sub-algorithm ReKeyGen(pki, pkj, t) and returns the re-encryption key rki j,t  
ReKeyGen(ski, pkj, t) such that the re-encryption key is sealed into an authorization structure AuthStruct(t)  
(Hash(t), rki j,t ), where ski is the secret key corresponding to the public key pki. If pki or pkj are not in Tk, C returns
? for rki j,t We have (pki, rki j,t ) KeygenDO(i, t, pki, pkj).
• Corrupted key generation oracle Ockg (i, t): Given user identity i and category t 2 T , The challenger C chooses a
security parameter k and runs the algorithm KeygenDO (i, t, pki, pkj) to generate a key pair (pki, ski). C returns the key
pair (pki, ski) to A and inputs (pki, ski) in Table Tk. Furthermore, given two public keys pki, pkj such that (pki, pkj) 2 Tk,
and a type t , C runs the KeygenDO sub-algorithm ReKeyGen(pki, pkj, t) and returns the re-encryption key rki j,t  
ReKeyGen(ski, pkj, t) such that the re-encryption key is sealed into an authorization structure AuthStruct(t)  
(Hash(t), rki j,t ), where ski is the secret key corresponding to the public key pki. If (pki, ski) or (pkj, skj) are not
in Tk, C returns ? for rki j,t . We have (pki, ski, rki j,t ) KeygenDO(i, t, pki, pkj).
• Ciphertext re-encryption oracle Ocro(Ci, pki, pkj, t): Given two public keys pki and pkj, a type t and the original
ciphertext Ci, C runs the algorithm CloudCheck(i, Ci, pkj, t, ReKeyGen(ski, pkj, t)), and outputs the re-encrypted
ciphertext Cj that it returns to A, where ski is the secret key corresponding to the public key pki.
• Decryption oracle Odec(pki, Ci, t): Given a public key pki, a type t and a ciphertext Ci, the challenger C returns the
plaintext m Decrypt(skj, Ci, t), where skj is the secret key corresponding to the public key pkj.
In our scheme, we work in the static corruption model where the adversary decides the corrupted users before the game
starts. A public key is good if output by Oukg , meaning the user is legitimate and bad if output by Ockg , meaning the user is
malicious or the user private key is known to or has been corrupted by the adversary. Furthermore, as the work in [7], we
only consider in this work ciphertexts supporting re-encryption because our scheme does not generate ciphertexts which
cannot be re-encrypted, which leads us to focus only on the security of original ciphertext also known as second level
ciphertext. We give below the definition of the semantic security for our unidirectional single hop TB-PRE ⇧x scheme
under chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA). Our scheme security is further defined on the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman
(DBDH) assumption.
A.1.1. Definition (CCA-security for Our TB-PRE)
A TB-PRE scheme is semantically secure against an adaptively chosen ciphertext attack according to the work in [36]
if for any given polynomial time TB-PRE-CCA adversaryA, AdvCCA ATB PRE(k) is negligible.
A.1.2. Complexity assumptions
Our scheme security is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DBDH) assumption. We first define the DBDH
problem below.
Let (p, g,G,GT , e) BSetup(1k). The DBDH problem is defined as follows: Given (g, ga, gb, gc, T ) for a, b, c 2 Z⇤p and
T 2 GT , decide if T = e(g, g)abc . An algorithm A has advantage ✏ in solving DBDH problem if |Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gd, g 1d , gbc, gdc,
e(g, g)ac) = 0]  Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gd, g 1d , gbc , gdc , T ) = 0]| ✏, with the probability over the random choice of a, b, c 2 Z⇤p ,
random choice of T in GT , random choice of g 2 G⇤ and finally, on the random bits of A.
A.2. Security analysis
We first denote in this subsection the following interesting lemma.
Lemma 1. For the events E1, E2 and G defined on some probability space, we consider that the event S1
W¬G occurs if and
only if S2
W¬G occurs. In other words, |Pr(E1)   Pr(E2)| Pr(G). The security of our offline TB-PRE is summarized in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 1 (TB-PRE-CCA Security). Our scheme is TB-PRE-CCA secure in the random oracle model if solving the DBDH problem
is hard.
Proof. We define an incremental sequence of games beginning by the real attack game denoted as Game G0 up to Game
G12, clearly showing that the adversary A cannot break the scheme. Let Ei be the event that b = b0 in Game Gi, with b
being the bit involved in the challenge phase and b0 the output of A in the guess phase. We have:
• Game G0 relates to the real attack and therefore |Pr[E0]  1/2|= AdvCCA ATB PRE(k).
• In Game G1, all the hash functions are replaced by random oracles. As we work in the random oracle model, we have
Pr[E1] = Pr[E0].
• In Game G2, we change Oh0 and the challenge phase by guessing the target message type t⇤. The probability of
guessing the right t⇤ is at least 1qh0 , with qh0 being the maximum number of queries to Oh0, therefore having
Pr[E2]   1qh0 Pr[E1].
• In Game G3, we change Oh1 and the challenge phase by defining h⇤ = h, where h R   Z⇤p . Game G3 and Game G2 are
indistinguishable if the adversary never queries Oh1 with mb k h⇤. Therefore, |Pr[E3]  Pr[E2]| qh1p , where qh1 is the
maximum number of queries to Oh1.
• In Game G4, we modify our TB-PRE decryption oracle concerning the following case. The adversary computes
c2 = H3(c0, c1)v without knowing v. We have |Pr[E4] Pr[E3]| qTdec .✏BF , where ✏BF is the probability of the adversary
A to break the scheme BF in [], and qTdec is the maximum number of queries to OTdec .
• In Game G5, we change the TB-PRE decryption oracle by using the re-encryption decryption oracle. Because of the
correctness of TB-PRE, this change is purely conceptual. Therefore Pr[E5] = Pr[E4].
• In Game G6, we define g 0 = g+1 which is chosen randomly from G. The challenger C has knowledge of a value g 1
satisfying e(g=1, g 1) = e(g, g) but is unaware of the value of loggg+1. However, the change is purely conceptual.
Therefore Pr[E6] = Pr[E5].
• In Game G7, we change the re-encryption decryption oracle as follow. The re-encryption output with the challenge
ciphertext are recorded in Table Tre. Due to restrictions in the security model, the change is purely conceptual.
Therefore, Pr[E7] = Pr[E6].
• In Game G8, we modify the re-encryption key generation oracle by using random oracles. We therefore have
Pr[E8] = Pr[E7]
• In Game G9, we change the uncorrupted key generation and the corrupted key generation by using the DBDH problem
input. We therefore have |Pr[E9]  Pr[E8]| qokg .✏DBDH .
• In Game G10, we change the challenge phase by using random values (X, Y , V , Z). Using the DBDH assumption, we
have |Pr[E10]  Pr[E9]| ✏DBDH . Furthermore, Pr[E10] = 12 due to the randomness of (A, B, C, T ).
By combining the different games above, we prove our scheme secure in the random oracle model using the Lemma 1,
under assumptions that the DBDH problem is hard. We hence complete our proof.
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